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"Modernity, in whatever age it appears," says Jean-Francois Lyotard, "cannot exist without a 
shattering of belief and without discovery of the 'lack of reality' of reality, together with the 
invention of other realities."
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 The belief that was shattered by Woolf and her fellow-modernists 
was the belief in there being a ready-made path to truth. As a self-conscious writer, Woolf was 
compelled to question the "inherited conglomerate"
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 and the meaning of the terms that go along 
with it—'reality' and 'truth', art’, ‘form’, and ‘character’. Although these terms are often 
interchangeable for Woolf, my focus here will be on her concept of  'character'. That character is 
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pivotal to Woolf‘s aesthetics seems obvious from her early assertion that “in or about December, 
1910, human character changed.” “All human relations have shifted. . . . And when human 
relations change there is at the same time a change in religion, conduct, politics, and literature.”3  
My discussion of Woolf's concept of character will address three interrelated questions: 
(1) why does Woolf make 'character' the architectonic principle of the novel?; (2) how does her 
concept of character operate in Mrs Dalloway; and (3) what is the ethical import of Woolf's 
concept of character?. 
I 
In her major essays Woolf insists that the novel should be reconceived as an aesthetic object—a 
dramatic-prose-poem—where the revelation of character is the outcome of aesthetic affect. 
“There is not a critic alive now," she complains, "who will say that a novel is a work of art and 
that as such he will judge it.” What is needed is someone who will rescue “the poor lady whom . 
. . we still persist in calling the art of fiction.”4 Her aim was to establish a new “code of manners 
which writers and readers accept as a prelude to the more exciting intercourse of friendship” 
(1.334).  
But to forge this new 'friendship',  Woolf had to reconstruct a critical and literary history 
on which to ground her experiments. And what she continually emphasized was that the novel 
should fuse classical drama and Romantic sensibility, and replace drama by emulating its 
effects: “The novels which make us live imaginatively, with the whole of the body as well as the 
mind, produce in us the physical sensations of heat and cold, noise and silence”; they produce 
“an emotion which is both distinct and unique” ("Phases of Fiction," 2.71).  
The primary shift in her aesthetics is to identify the formal affectivism of the novel with  
the revelation of character, while altogether demoting  ‘plot’ or action. Throughout her literary 
history she denies plot any positive role, even in drama, while promoting character. Beginning 
with Greek tragedy, she affirms “nobody can fail to remember the plot of the Antigone, because 
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what happens is so closely bound up with the emotions of the actors that we remember the 
people and the plot at one and the same time" ( “Notes on an Elizabethan Play,” 1.56). 
In Elizabethan drama (except for the works of Shakespeare and Ben Jonson), she attacks 
plot as the enemy of character,  finding no necessary connection between “the story” and “the 
emotions which it has aroused,” which leads her to conclude that Elizabethan drama has “no 
characters.” Where plot is paramount, “the actors themselves are obliterated and emotions which 
. . . deserve . . .  the most delicate analysis are clean sponged off the slate” (1.56-57).  
Her attack on ‘plot’ strikes a new pitch when she turns to neoclassical drama:  
 
Who can remember the plot when the book is shut?. . . .; a plot should put the characters 
on the rack and show them thus extended. But what are we to say when the plot merely 
teases and distorts the character? (“Congreve’s Comedies,” 1.77) 
 
And the final toppling of plot occurs in Romantic criticism, where, following Coleridge, Woolf 
casts Shakespeare as the greatest Romantic poet who appeals not to the actions seen on the stage 
but to the imagination.   
Yet Shakespeare, at the same time, is also Woolf’s model for creating character. 
Novelists, she writes, should “make real thoughts and real emotions issue in real words from 
living lips;” they should “practise the great, the Shakespearean art, of making people reveal 
themselves in speech” (“Sir Walter Scott,” 1.138, 143).  
Stressing character throughout her essays, it seems to exceed the accepted meaning of 
the word; Woolf appears to equate character with the aesthetic form of the novel, the precise 
impression it leaves on the mind. But, as she insists in “Phases of Fiction,” aesthetic impressions 
are not haphazard: “nobody reads simply by chance or without a definite scale of values” (2.56; 
emphasis added). This “definite scale of values” hinges on character and becomes the ultimate 
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criterion to justify her literary preferences--“The Psychologists” (James, Proust, Dostoevsky), 
“The Poets” (Bronte, Hardy,  Tolstoy), and the precursors of the modern novel, Jane Austen and 
Laurence Sterne. In Austen’s novels, for example, she finds that  “always the stress is laid upon 
character” (“Jane Austen,” 1.148). Speculating on how Austen's style would have evolved, 
Woolf describes her own ideal style: Austen, she says,  
 
would have devised a method, clear and composed as ever, but deeper and more 
suggestive, for conveying not only what people say, but what they leave unsaid; not only 
what they are, but what life is. (1.153)  
 
These examples underscore two central points in Woolf's aesthetics: if the  novel is to 
become a work of art,  writers must be free to determine their fictions, and if their fictional 
characters are to strike us as real, novelists should focus on "the dark places of psychology." 
"Everything is the proper stuff of fiction," she states, "every feeling, every thought; every quality 
of brain and spirit is drawn upon; no perception comes amiss." And her defence of artistic 
freedom is captured in the famous statement:  "Life is not a series of gig-lamps symmetrically 
arranged", i.e., life as experienced or as reproduced in novels is not reducible to laws or facts; 
"life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of 
consciousness to the end", i.e., the self is a function of how a person experiences life, the 'semi-
transparent envelope' that surrounds it (2.106). 'Consciousness' presupposes a world, and vice 
versa. "I believe that all novels begin with an old lady in the corner opposite. I believe that all 
novels . . . deal with characters, and that it is to express character . . . that the form of the novel 
has been evolved" (1.324).  
"Character" clearly has more than one meaning for her. As a critical term it conveys the 
uniqueness of a writer’s style as the unity of a work of imaginative prose. As a literary term it 
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denotes a fictional self but also  general humanity; it is used as a criterion in literary history and 
critical history; it replaces the conventional 'plot' but performs its unifying function; it is at once 
the body but also the soul of the novel; its aesthetics and ethics conjoined. Woolf's multilayered 
meaning of the term is perhaps best conveyed by her semi-question: “Think how little we know 
about character—think how little we know about art” (1.320; emphasis added). Just as art 
entails a whole civilization, "character" for Woolf is the self-reflexive mobius strip that unites art 
and life. 
 
II 
Mrs Dalloway is a test case for further clarifying Woolf's concept of character and for assessing 
whether it successfully replaces 'plot' as the aesthetic principle of the novel.
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  How, then, are we 
to make sense of this novel where so little happens and so little is said? And what has the 
subplot, the story of shell-shocked Septimus Warren Smith, going around London in search of 
medical help, got to do with Clarissa Dalloway's thoughts throughout the morning, afternoon, 
and evening party? After all, the two never meet in the novel, and yet by the end of it, the two 
stories come together in a moment of intense pathos, as though the novel could not have ended 
without their strange, improbable meeting.  
The psychology explored in the novel can be sharply delineated with the aid of  Edmund 
Burke's A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful,
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 his 
empirical study of the two concepts that have dominated and divided aesthetic discourse from 
the 18
th
 century onwards. I want to show that Woolf's notion of 'character' in fiction comes into 
full view through what she implicitly adheres to in Burke's scheme, but even more importantly, 
through what she implicitly rejects in it. Put simply, my claim is that while Woolf upholds the 
distinction between the opposing orders of the sublime and beautiful on the surface level of Mrs 
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Dalloway, she at the same time methodically subverts their hierarchy on the deeper level of the 
novel. It is this subversion, I suggest, that discloses the ethical import of her aesthetics.  
Burke’s Enquiry is based on the opposition between pain and pleasure; the existential is 
categorically opposed to the social, as death is to life and madness to sanity. The emotions that 
relate to self-preservation--danger, sickness, and above all, death--are necessarily stronger than 
those that relate to society. This may be summarized as a distinction between things that produce 
terror and things that produce love. The former are “dark and gloomy,” “solid and massive,” and 
“vast in their dimensions”; they “overwhelm our will.” The latter are “light and delicate,” 
“smooth and polished,” “comparatively small” and they submit to our will. The sublime and the 
beautiful, Burke concludes, "are indeed ideas of a very different nature, . . . and however they 
may vary afterwards from the direct nature of their causes, yet these causes keep up an eternal 
distinction between them" (113-14).   
As we begin reading Mrs Dalloway it is immediately evident that Clarissa Dalloway 
fulfills Burke’s requirements of the beautiful just as Peter Walsh and Septimus Warren Smith 
fulfill his requirements of the sublime. Clarissa represents the social passions of sympathy, 
comfort and pleasure (epitomized by the party), whereas Peter and Septimus represent states of 
distress and terror (Peter is always armed with his pen-knife, and Septimus is suffering from 
shell-shock). Clarissa is a member of the social elite; Peter, acknowledged by all to be a worldly 
failure, and Septimus, who succumbs to madness, are among those who are excluded from the 
social order.  
The surface action consists of people going about their everyday life, intermixed with their 
remembering the past and imagining the future, and the still deeper levels of sense, feeling, and 
emotion. There are for example the sudden shifts in mood, when moments of anger, terror, and 
despair alternate with moments of elation. Apart from these well-concealed mood shifts, nothing 
unremarkable happens in Mrs. Dalloway and everything leads to Clarissa’s party. There are only 
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two unusual events on that day in the middle of June, 1923: soon after 11 o'clock when Clarissa 
returns home with the flowers for her party, Peter Walsh, whom she had rejected twenty years 
earlier, visits her unannounced, having arrived in London from India the  night before; and  
several hours later, at 6 pm, Septimus flings himself from the window of his flat, just as Dr. 
Holmes arrives to take him away to an asylum. (There is one other unexpected guest, Sally 
Seton, Clarissa's intimate friend from the past, who arrives unannounced to the party.)  
Clarissa does nothing apart from the most routine actions throughout the day and almost 
never addresses anyone else. And yet we know her as no one else can know her. Her character is 
mainly conveyed by her silent speech, which weaves scenes from the present into the past and 
scenes from past into the present. How, though, are Clarissa’s moments, which range from the 
banal to the revelatory, relate to those of Peter and those of Septimus? What do their hidden 
stories have in common?  
This question directs us to the novel's 'dark places of psychology', and it is here, in the 
novel's diachronic representation of experience that Burke's brilliant theory proves inadequate. 
This is so because by excluding danger, pain, and terror from the realm of social intercourse, 
Burke denies the existential dimension of human relationships. He excludes desire--“the passion 
which belongs to generation” (39)--from the consideration of human misery and happiness. 
“Men,” he explains, “are at all times pretty equally disposed to the pleasures of love, because 
they are to be guided by reason in the time and manner of indulging them. Had any great pain 
arisen from the want of this satisfaction, reason . . . would find great difficulties in the 
performance of its office” (38). Reason, Woolf shows, indeed has “great difficulties in the 
performance of its office” when separated from desire, as becomes clear by her making 
Septimus’s suicide the mise-en-abyme of the novel. 
For it is precisely what Burke brushes aside as unimportant that is experienced by Clarissa, 
Peter, and Septimus as actual pain and horror. Loss of love is the substance of their solitary, 
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unspoken inner struggles. It is the substance too of the growing bond that draws them together, 
while appearing on the surface plot as mere contingency. By connecting dramatically the stories 
of Clarissa’s and Peter’s unfulfilled love with Septimus’s suicide, Woolf shows loss of love as 
genuine pain, with existential rather than merely social consequences. And she brings the three 
stories together in Burke's paradigmatic setting of the beautiful: Clarissa‘s party. 
During the party the news of a young man’s death is thrust upon Clarissa by one of her 
guests. “Oh! thought Clarissa, in the middle of my party, here’s death” (201). She leaves her 
guests and alone, in  a little room, she plunges into her pain, “her dress flamed, her body burnt,” 
but after a while she emerges from her meditation as a person replenished, as if cured: 
 
A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about with chatter, defaced, obscured in 
her own life, let drop every day in corruption, lies, chatter. This he had preserved. Death was 
defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate. . . . There was an embrace in death. (202)  
 
Clarissa's initially shocked response to the stranger's death induces a change in her state of 
'character', she feels that "Somehow it was her disaster—her disgrace" (203). But by taking to 
heart Septimus's death, by vicariously living through it herself, his intrusion into her world 
releases her of her own hidden 'other': that "thing, wreathed about with chatter, defaced, 
obscured in her own life."  Her shock gives way to its opposite, an elated sense of well-being: 
"Odd, incredible; she had never been so happy." What are we to make of her sudden 
transformation? Why is she “so happy”? "Happy" about what? What is it that Clarissa has 
discovered? She remembers how she had once “walked on the terrace at Bourton” and seen the 
moon rise in the night sky. Was it then that she was “so happy” or is it now, thinking of the 
“young man” who's killed himself? The two events blend into each other. With the final tolling 
of Big Ben, as Clarissa turns away from looking at the night sky, she can return to her guests, to  
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Peter and Sally, salvaging what has lain buried in her throughout the day, their bond of love and 
friendship. This imperceptible transformative moment echoes the philosopher‘s words: "It is 
clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one.)."
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Perhaps it is also a glimpse of  that "luminous halo": Clarissa hosting  the stranger and those she 
has grown estranged from, including her own past, by enfolding them into her present thoughts 
and feelings. Just as her party draws together the people and events of the entire day, her 
empathic response affirms that the capacity for love, in all its forms, constitutes the human and, 
is therefore a constituent part of what we call society. 
 
III 
What, then, is  the ethical import of Woolf's concept of character? Clarissa’s moments 
throughout the day relate her distress  to its cause—her fear of death, “of time itself.” Early in 
the novel we hear that she has always known that “it was very, very dangerous to live even one 
day” (11) and at the same time her life, by any external standard, is secure and comfortable. Why 
would it be dangerous to live even one day for a person who incarnates the “social”? It would be 
so only if there is nothing with which to contrast the social; if there is no nonsocial dimension of 
human existence. The causes of the sublime and the beautiful are not opposed, as they are for 
Burke; they coexist in all the things we associate with ordinary life. They mix and overlap; they 
inhere in all those things. This invokes another simple truth: "Man is by nature a social being." I 
can here only suggest why Woolf's rejection of the hierarchical and gendered opposition of the 
sublime and  beautiful converges on Aristotle's down-to-earth aesthetics and ethics. Since Woolf 
is primarily concerned with showing her characters' dispositions and tracing their causes, only a 
moral theory that accommodates both actions and feelings, conceives of the individual as part of 
society, and upholds human freedom, would be adequate to it. The novel, we recall, ends with 
Peter's ecstatic vision of Clarissa approaching him:  
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What is this terror? what is this ecstasy? . . . What is it that fills me with extraordinary 
excitement?  
It is Clarissa, he said. 
For there she was. (213) 
 
Like Peter, we can only behold Clarissa as an individual who embodies the spirit of life itself. It  
is those we sympathize with, in the real world and no less in novels—for a complex feedback 
system links the two—that sharpens and tests our moral sense.  
Woolf‘s plea on behalf of “the poor lady whom . . . we still persist in calling the art of 
fiction” thus establishes art as a reflection on and of human reality, affirming their 
interdependence, with ethics as their common ground. For if there is nothing in human 
experience that does not carry ethical import we are all involved in saving the "poor lady", in 
saving life. Art, however, though it is coterminous with ethics, would cease to be art if it openly 
declared its moral teachings.  On this matter Woolf's position appears clear: Because art recreates 
life and discloses human character, it reveals what philosophy, in ordering our ideas of the 
world, obscures. This is so because the aim of the artist is to “to kindle and illuminate” the 
extraordinary in the ordinary mind on an ordinary day; the aim of the philosopher is to subject 
the irrational to rational inquiry. Art, accordingly, configures experience and knowledge, as in 
the microcosm of Clarissa's party, where a whole range of moments—sublime, beautiful, 
philosophic and lyrical—blend and resolve themselves in a moment of tragic pathos. 
By making character her central aesthetic concept, Woolf appears to be saying that 
"ethics and aesthetics are one," or in her own lyrical prose:  
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that behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we—I mean all human beings—are 
connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work 
of art. . . . we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself.
8
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